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Scientific Jury Selection:  






“Never forget, almost every case has been won or lost when the jury is sworn.”  
– Clarence Darrow (defense attorney), 1936. 
 
Introduction 
Juries decide thousands of cases every year. Even though the majority of 
court cases are not settled by juries, predictions about juries influence decisions to 
pursue or avoid jury trials (Greene, Chopra, Kovera, Penrod, Rose, Schuller et al., 
2002); therefore, the jury system maintains a central importance in American law. 
Given this importance, it is not surprising that the selection of jurors has, for many, 
become a scientifically-rooted service for which attorneys and litigants will often 
pay handsome fees. Scientific jury selection – the application of behavioral and 
social scientific principles to the selection of jurors most sympathetic to a 
particular side in a court case – has experienced a growth spurt since its inception 
in the early 1970s. It has also received substantial publicity in the news media, e.g., 
for its use by the defense in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial in 1995. This relatively 
new field is controversial: questions exist about its effectiveness, its fairness and 
the fact that it is virtually unregulated. Evidence from academia largely indicates 
that scientific jury selection does no good, yet the market for such services 
continues to flourish.  What methods do jury selection experts employ? What are 
the bases for the controversy surrounding this “hot” field? What, if any, solutions 
have been suggested to alleviate these concerns? 
 
History of Jury Selection: The “Harrisburg Seven” and Subsequent Trials 
 
 Scientific jury selection (SJS) was first applied in 1971 in the trial of Philip 
Berrigan and six other antiwar activists. Jay Schulman, a sociologist from 
Columbia University, signed on along with Richard Christie, Philip Shaver, and 
others to assist the defense team of these activists, the so-called “Harrisburg 
Seven,” who had been accused, among other things, of conspiring to destroy 
selective service records and kidnap then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. 
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These scholars volunteered because they believed in the activists’ cause and 
suspected that the prosecutor (in this case, the government) had selected 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, as the venue for the trial because of its rampant political 
conservatism.  Schulman believed that the people comprising a jury have as much, 
if not more, influence on the outcome of a trial as do the evidence and the 
attorneys’ arguments (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). Because a jury biased in favor of 
the defense would not have been likely in that venue, Schulman’s team set as their 
goal the procurement of a jury that would at least be fair to the defendants. 
Securing such a fair jury required extra effort: the attitudes largely held by 
Harrisburg residents indicated that a local jury would not be favorable for their 
side. Pretrial polling suggested that eight out of ten registered voters held views 
unfavorable to the defense (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). Schulman and his colleagues 
surveyed over 1,000 Harrisburg residents and conducted follow-up interviews. 
They came up with a demographic profile of individuals most and least likely to 
sympathize with the defense and used this profile to guide jury selection. The 
defense achieved a victory: the jury hung on most charges, delivering only a minor 
conviction (for smuggling letters out of prison) (Kressel & Kressel, 2002).  
Throughout the 1970s, social scientists participated in jury selection in 
several politically charged trials. In the Joan Little criminal trial, a team of social 
scientists led by John McConahay, a Duke University psychology professor, 
assisted the defense in first granting a change of venue (Little was an African-
American woman and surveys revealed that the North Carolina county where the 
trial was to be held was atypically racist) and then in jury selection by constructing 
a profile of the ideal juror for the defense. The jury acquitted Little of all charges 
after barely an hour of deliberations (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). Subsequent trials 
in which scientific jury selection was used include the Angela Davis trial, the 
Wounded Knee trials, trials stemming from the Attica prison riots, the trial of Mark 
David Chapman (John Lennon’s assassin), Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 
Vietnam veterans against the manufacturers of Agent Orange, the trials of Attorney 
General John Mitchell and defendant Maurice Stans (Watergate), and Colombian 
drug lord Carlos Lehder, among others (Boudouris, 1993). Many of these trials 
ended with verdicts favorable to the side employing jury selection experts 
(Frederick, 1984). In 1980, MCI used scientific jury selection in its antitrust suit 
against fellow communications corporation AT&T, in which a jury awarded MCI a 
surprising $600 million (Strier, 1999).  
 
Growth of an Industry 
During the 1980s, the jury selection market expanded into the industry today 
known as trial consulting. Firms that provide jury selection have greatly expanded 
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their services and consulting firms have grown in size and in volume of business 
(Cutler, 1990). The growth of the industry appeared to benefit both academicians 
and consultants: academic theories found a practical application, while consultants 
were able to derive legitimacy from their affiliation with research institutions. Trial 
consultants drew on academic principles as well as market research and advertising 
strategies, such as focus groups and consumer profiling. Despite this initial fusion 
of theory and practice, consulting today takes place largely outside of academia, 
and has lost the political charge it had in the 1970s. Consulting firms today offer a 
wide range of services, including in-court assessments, focus groups, change of 
venue surveys, mock trials, shadow juries, witness preparation, attorney 
communication evaluation, and evidence preparation. Scientific jury selection 
remains one of the more well-known and controversial of services offered by trial 
consultants.  
 
Jury Selection Today 
 The use of social scientists as jury selection consultants remains 
controversial in both the legal and social scientific communities (Stolle, Robbenolt 
& Wiener, 1996). Trial consultants have relied on a variety of methods in jury 
selection, including “scientific statistical methodology, folklore, pop psychology 
[and] astrology” (Boudouris, 1993, p. 4). The unscientific aspects of what is 
ostensibly a scientifically informed practice are illustrated in the self-reported 
methods of jury selection reported by trial consultants. For example, Jo-Ellan 
Dimitrius, who successfully “stacked” the jury in several well-known criminal 
cases, including the O.J. Simpson, Reginald Denny, John DuPont and McMartin 
preschool criminal trials, has remarked that, for her, “reading people is neither a 
science nor an innate gift. It is a matter of knowing what to look and listen for, 
having the curiosity and patience to gather the necessary information, and 
understanding how to recognize the patterns in a person’s appearance, body 
language, voice, and conduct” (Dimitrius & Mazzarella, 1998, p. xiii). Dimitrius’s 
claimed methods and the methods mentioned earlier are assumed to have varied 
degrees of legitimacy, thus lending further controversy to the profession. Despite 
this controversy, SJS remains prominent. Today, trial consultants are extremely 
common in high-stakes civil suits and are usually retained by both sides – in fact, 
many attorneys say that hiring a trial consultant is standard procedure when 
substantial amounts of money are involved. Trial consultants also help both sides 
in many criminal cases that have garnered substantial media attention (Kressel & 
Kressel, 2002). The 1995 criminal trial of the famous football player O.J. Simpson, 
the suspect in the murders of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown, and her friend, Ron 
Goldman, in June 1994, is one such example. Although jury selection has been an 
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expensive undertaking for attorneys in the post-Vietnam War era, low-cost 
consulting services have recently been introduced, making it possible for trial 
consultants to assist in smaller, lower budget cases than they had in the past 
(Kressel & Kressel, 2002).  
 Traditional jury selection in most jurisdictions consists of three stages. The 
first stage involves the creation of a list of citizens eligible for jury duty, followed 
by selection of a sample of those persons to be summoned to court. The third stage 
occurs in court. In a process called voir dire, potential jurors are questioned either 
individually or in a group, sometimes by attorneys but often by the presiding judge. 
When jury selection experts are called in to help, they use a variety of techniques 
to assist in the selection of the jury that will be most favorable to, or, usually, least 
biased against, their side (these techniques will be detailed in the next section). 
Diversity of techniques is not surprising, given that trial consultants themselves are 
professionally diverse. Trial consultants include in their ranks (but are not limited 
to) behavioral psychologists, sociologists, attorneys, and those with varying 
degrees of expertise in communications and marketing. Trial consulting is 
estimated to be a $400 million industry, with over 400 firms and over 700 
practitioners (Strier, 1999).  
 
Methods of Scientific Jury Selection 
 The tools at a trial consultant’s disposal include community surveys, focus 
groups, mock trials, pretrial investigations of prospective jurors, and voir dire 
assistance. The widespread use of these methods indicates that SJS experts rely to 
a greater extent on attitudes and values than on demographic predictors, such as 
race, ethnicity, age, gender, religion, socio-economic status and occupation, as 
predictors in jury decision-making (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). The community 
survey is one of the most common practices that trial consultants employ.  The 
researcher randomly chooses between 200 and 300 names from the telephone 
book, phones these individuals, reads them a case summary, and asks a series of 
questions. To ensure representativeness, the sample should be limited to people 
who are eligible for jury duty. Survey questions are generally of three types: 1) 
questions about participants’ attitudes about the particular case and issues to be 
raised therein, 2) questions about participants’ familiarity with the case and the 
named defendants, and 3) questions concerning respondents’ demographic 
characteristics and personality traits (Penrod, 1990). Sophisticated statistical 
techniques, including factor analysis and multiple regression, are often used to 
make predictions about jury decision-making from survey data.  
The use of a focus group is a practice borrowed from marketing, the 
occupational origin of many jury selection experts. A focus group is intended to 
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represent a cross-section of the community, and the demographic characteristics of 
participants in the focus group should be similar to those of people in the jury pool 
or on the actual jury. This group is assembled to test specific parts of an attorney’s 
case, much as a focus group would test a product about to be introduced on the 
market. When individuals with certain personality types can be identified by the 
focus group as amenable to an attorney’s case, this information is often used in SJS 
and in approaches to other parts of the case.  The mock trial, another service 
frequently offered by trial consultants, is an extension of the focus group and can 
be a “full dress rehearsal” (Strier, 1999, p. 96).  
Trial consultants also frequently employ pretrial investigations of 
prospective jurors. This type of pretrial investigation, as depicted in fiction (e.g., 
the 2003 hit movie Runaway Jury and the novel by John Grisham (1996) on which 
it was based), may contribute to the popular perception of jury selection 
techniques. As in Runaway Jury, such investigations mainly take two forms: 
community network modeling and surveillance. Community network modeling 
consists of contacting prospective jurors’ coworkers or neighbors, or people in the 
community who are affiliated with the same school, church, or club as a 
prospective juror. Surveillance includes drive-by observations and photograph-
taking of a prospective juror, and checking public records of each prospective 
juror, such as those of voter registration, court proceedings, and property holdings. 
Not surprisingly, both techniques have met with accusations of privacy invasion 
(Strier, 1999).  Trial consultants can assist attorneys with voir dire by using 
questionnaires to gather information about prospective jurors prior to in-court 
questioning and by observing prospective jurors’ courtroom demeanor and 
nonverbal communication (Strier, 1999). Once a trial is underway, a trial 
consultant can use knowledge of the selected jury to assist the attorney with 
opening and closing arguments, witness preparation, case presentation, and 
evidence. 
  
Issues with Jury Selection: Effectiveness, Fairness, and Lack of Regulation 
 Franklin Strier (1999) has pointed out three issues which keep the practices 
of scientific jury selection steeped in controversy. The first issue concerns the 
effectiveness of such practices. It is difficult to answer questions about the 
effectiveness of SJS by analyzing court cases. It is not possible to claim with any 
certainty that a favorable verdict is completely due to scientific jury selection 
(Strier, 1999). Some have remarked (Hans & Vidmar, 1986) that jury verdicts are 
determined by many factors and that one cannot know the extent to which SJS 
contributed to the verdicts. Experimental research may be weak at detecting the 
interplay between various factors, such as the evidence presented, the 
persuasiveness of eyewitnesses, and attorney characteristics, affecting the outcome 
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of a jury trial. It is thus difficult to isolate the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of any 
one of these factors (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). In addition, factors affecting the 
use of SJS may also affect case outcomes. For example, a client who could afford a 
jury selection expert could probably also afford to retain superior attorneys; 
lawyers who are conscientious enough to hire a social scientist to help with their 
case are often thorough in other aspects of their case preparation. The absence of a 
non-SJS comparison group in past evaluations of SJS also presents a problem vis-
à-vis evaluations of SJS effectiveness (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). Such a group 
might not even be feasible, however, given that, for a true test of the effectiveness 
of SJS, identical conditions would need to apply between the two experimental 
groups, and the probability that researchers could recreate such identical conditions 
between the two groups (the SJS treatment group and the control/non-SJS 
comparison group) is minimal to nonexistent. There is also a noticeable lack of 
scientific research evaluating newer trial consulting techniques that, in 
combination with SJS, could influence the outcome of a case (Stolle, Robbenolt & 
Wiener, 1996; Strier, 1999).  
 The second issue concerns the fairness of scientific jury selection. This 
question is particularly salient if, indeed, the effectiveness question is settled in 
favor of SJS. If SJS is effective enough to alter the composition of juries to affect 
the verdict, then its use could violate citizens’ Constitutional right to an impartial 
jury. However, if SJS is not effective, it contributes unnecessarily to the time and 
cost of trials. Even if the effectiveness of SJS remains unclear or if SJS is 
determined not to be effective, the fairness question persists. It is important to 
maintain a perception of fairness, and even if SJS is not effective, it can still give 
the impression of interference with the jury process (Strier, 1999). The third issue 
on which Strier remarks is that the field of trial consulting is largely unregulated 
and lacks clear professional standards. These issues will be addressed in the 
following section.  
    
Problems with Jury Selection 
A. It Does Not Work 
 As previously mentioned, scientific jury selection has generated controversy 
in both the legal and social scientific communities. Some legal experts have argued 
against it by claiming that jury selection is an art rather than a science, and that the 
intuition of an experienced trial attorney is superior to any social scientific 
approach. Many social scientist critics have argued that, while approaches from 
their fields are likely no worse than reliance on lawyers’ instincts, whatever 
discoverable benefit of social scientific approaches may still not outweigh their 
cost (Stolle, Robbenolt & Wiener, 1996).  
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 In any event, opponents have advanced various positions converging on the 
purported ineffectiveness of SJS. It is possible that practitioners or academic 
advocates of SJS have not produced sufficient evidence that SJS works (Cutler, 
1990). Results from academic research laboratories have not supported SJS 
practices. Trial attorneys have not outperformed undergraduates in studies of jury 
selection, lending doubt to the credibility of lawyers’ instincts in deciding the 
suitability of jurors (Olczak, Kaplan, & Penrod, 1991). Dawn Lord, a critic of SJS, 
points out the instability of knowledge employed by jury selection experts. She 
writes that many jury selection experts ignore established psychological principles 
in their work. In selecting jurors, they rely on prospective jurors’ explicit, verbally 
articulated knowledge, which is less durable and predictable than is implicit, 
automatic, if even conscious, knowledge. Lord also argues that SJS practitioners 
also do not take into account differences between the reactions of emotionally 
aroused jurors and those of jurors who are not upset. These differences could also 
affect what jurors take away from courtroom proceedings. As a result of these 
practices, she argues, attorneys and their clients do not reap the benefits of the 
behavioral and cognitive research on which the practice purports to be based (Lord, 
2001).  
 A second point against the effectiveness of SJS is that quantitative studies of 
jury trials have estimated that jury selection accounts for between 5% and 15% of 
verdict variability; the extra-jury aspects of the tr ial therefore account for the vast 
majority of verdict variance (85%-95%) (Fulero & Penrod, 1990). These numbers 
suggest that, even if SJS practices were found to be influential, there is little room 
for SJS practices to have an effect if they only “count” for 15% of the final trial 
“grade.” 
 
Limits to SJS: Lack of Predictors 
One reason why SJS is often deemed ineffective is because certain limits to 
its exercise have been identified. As stated before, there is evidence that the ability 
of trial consultants to predict verdicts from jurors’ demographic and personality 
variables accounts for at most 15% of the variance in verdicts. There do not appear 
to be any reliable predictive demographic variables – juror occupation, gender, 
income, religion and age have not been found to have consistent effects across 
cases (Greene et al., 2002) – and it has not been possible to identify a personality 
type or combination of types that can predict juror decisions across criminal or 
civil cases (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). General tendencies toward conviction 
among jurors have not been satisfactorily identified; only weak relationships have 
been found between convictions across case types between hypothetical robbery, 
murder, rape and negligence trials (Penrod, 1990). In general, personality traits are 
not valid predictors of jurors’ voting predispositions. However, even those aspects 
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of personality which have been revealed as modest predictors of juror 
predispositions often have inconsistent effects. For example, the personality 
attribute “belief in a just world” can lead jurors to harshly punish either crime 
victims or defendants (Stolle et al., 1996). Another example of the inability of 
established behavioral principles to predict the voting of jurors concerns the voting 
of jurors in criminal cases toward defendants similar to themselves. The similarity-
leniency hypothesis advanced in social psychology suggests that a juror would not 
punish harshly a defendant similar to him/herself, and this is frequently the case. 
However, other times, a “black sheep effect” occurs when a juror reacts negatively 
to a similar defendant behaving badly, holding those more similar to themselves to 
a higher standard. It is difficult to predict with any certainty which of these two 
competing principles will operate in a given case. Preconceived attitudes and 
biases may generate more accurate predictions than will personality types, but 
people are often able to conceal such biases, especially when they may reflect 
negatively on the bias-holder (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). 
 
Limits to SJS: The Operation of Other Factors 
 Other factors can also affect trial outcomes, making jury selection less 
relevant as a verdict determinant. Certain areas are beyond the control of the trial 
consultant. These areas include the nature of the evidence, the acumen of the 
attorneys, the style of the presiding judge, and the complex group dynamic 
principles at work during jury deliberations (Boudouris, 1993).  Perhaps the quality 
of the evidence, rather than the individual personality attributes of jurors, 
ultimately determines a trial outcome. The effect of presented evidence on jury 
decisions should not be too easily discounted. If evidence is the determining factor 
in jury decision-making, then SJS becomes much less relevant. Strier (1999) 
suggests that trial consultants may offer their most valuable assistance to attorneys 
with evidence presentation rather than jury selection. When a trial consultant is 
retained, other factors can limit the consultant’s effectiveness. For example, 
attorney communication is critically important: if an attorney does not inform the 
trial consultant of all the facts of the case, including evidence potentially harmful 
to their side, this omission can steer jury selection in a direction unfavorable to the 
attorney (Boudouris, 1993).  
 
B. It is Fundamentally Unfair 
“The jury system is distorted by demographics. It is compromised by consultants … 
There doesn’t even seem to be a consensus anymore about what a ‘jury of one’s 
peers’ means. In fact, that’s the last thing many attorneys want and they’ll pay a 
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lot of money to make sure they don’t get it.” – George Cantor (critic of jury 
consulting), 1995 (following the O.J. Simpson criminal trial). 
 
 Today, concerns exist about the fairness of jury selection as a practice. The 
Jury Selection Service Act of 1968 explicitly states that criminal defendants have a 
right to trial by a jury selected “at random from a fair cross-section of the 
community.” Some critics have argued that SJS corrupts the objective of a trial by 
jury to represent such a cross-section of values. Although some Americans, 
namely, persons who do not register to vote or hold driver’s licenses, are regularly 
excluded from jury selection, SJS introduces exclusions with a scientific rationale 
in place of the aforementioned systematic exclusions (Strier, 1999). Another 
criticism of the fairness of SJS is that it is only affordable for wealthy corporations 
and individuals. Although some low-cost services have recently been offered, 
some as low as $2,000, in other cases, a jury selection expert could cost an attorney 
between $50,000 and $100,000. Strier (1999) points out the irony in this issue of 
affordability: the first people to benefit from the principles of SJS were poor 
criminal defendants of the 1970s antiwar persuasion. Despite the highly publicized 
cases flooding Court TV and other popular media, depicting charismatic celebrity 
criminal defendants, a more typical SJS client today is a wealthy litigant, often a 
corporation, involved in a civil suit (Levine, 1992). As such, SJS can appear to be 
mainly a “service for the rich and a disservice for justice” (Stolle et al., 1996, p. 
147). According to this argument, if trial consulting gives a litigant an advantage, 
then only large corporations and wealthy individuals would have this advantage, 
leaving the average litigant with a “second class justice” (Stolle et al., 1996, p. 
147).  
Another criticism of SJS indirectly concerns the Constitutionality of its 
implementation. SJS critic Stephen Adler has questioned the trustworthiness of 
decisions made by a group selected for their biases. He argued that jury consulting 
is not protected by anything in the Constitution and that its use can and should be 
prohibited (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). Yet another criticism of SJS on grounds of 
fairness is that trial consultants often advertise a misleading win-loss record that 
cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed (Strier, 2001).  
A final problem concerning the fairness of SJS actually has little to do with 
the actual fairness, but deals with the perceived fairness of the practice. Trial 
consulting can create the perception of “high-tech jury tampering,” through which 
psychologists and other so-called jury experts manipulate the eventual composition 
and/or decision-making bias of the jury (Strier, 1999, p. 104). If jury selection 
techniques are seen as unfair, the legal system as a whole may be viewed as 
similarly unfair (Stolle et al., 1996). Data about the perceived fairness of a trial can 
be difficult to obtain due to problems assigning quantities to subjective qualities 
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like fairness (Stolle et al., 1996). Stolle and colleagues (1996) found that the use of 
a psychologist trial consultant tended to be viewed as unfair when one side 
employed a consultant and the other did not. When both sides hired a consultant, 
judgments of fairness were not affected.  
 
C. The Industry is Unregulated 
 The third major issue identified by Strier (1999) concerns the relative lack of 
standards unifying professionals in this field. He points out that many professions 
applying principles from academics, including law and psychology, are closely 
regulated to protect public interests. In addition, professional associations 
frequently mandate a code of behavior and ethics that all practitioners are bound to 
follow. However, there are no such checks on the field of trial consulting. Because 
there are no state licensing requirements, anyone can advertise and practice as a 
“trial consultant.” The professional association in the field, the American Society 
of Trial Consultants (ASTC), has a Code of Professional Standards, which Strier 
calls “anemic” and much les strenuous than the standards set forth by the American 
Psychological Association (APA) (Strier, 2001, p. 71). It has even been suggested 
that some trial consultant practices violate APA standards (Herbsleb, Sales & 
Berman, 1979).  
 
Why Scientific Jury Selection Works:  
It Is Effective and Not Wholly Unfair  
 
“It’s gotten to the point where if the case is large enough, it’s almost malpractice 
not to use [a jury consultant].” – Donald Zoeller (New York attorney), 1989. 
 
Despite the problems previously mentioned, scientific jury selection has 
many fervent advocates. Many argue that, contrary to empirical evidence, SJS is an 
effective practice, or, at the very least, should not be dismissed prematurely. Others 
point out flaws in the evidence against SJS to this point. As Brian L. Cutler put it, 
“Academic researchers have, based on early reviews of a small but 
methodologically unsophisticated body of literature, thrown out the baby with the 
bathwater” (Cutler, 1990, p. 230). Attacks have been advanced against the earlier 
cited discounting studies and others based on the limited applicability of research 
findings from small, atypical samples, to the public as a whole (Moran & Comfort, 
1982). In particular, much research on SJS has relied on college student samples, 
when more representative community samples would be more appropriate if the 
findings are to be generalized across types of people and situations (Sears, 1986).   
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The Existence of Predictors of Jury Decision-Making 
Some advocates of SJS argue that, despite the arguments of opponents, there 
are juror aspects that can predict subsequent verdicts. For one, juror attitudes can 
predict verdicts better than can personality traits. Results from various studies are 
thus summarized: attitudes toward women predicted verdicts in rape cases (Weir & 
Wrightsman, 1990); attitudes toward psychiatrists and the insanity defense 
predicted verdicts in criminal cases where the insanity defense was invoked 
(Cutler, Moran & Narby, 1992); a relationship was found between attitudes toward 
the death penalty and verdict in capital punishment cases (Nietzel, McCarthy & 
Kern, 1999), and attitudes toward torts and lawsuits affect the amount of damages 
awarded in civil suits (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). Some personality traits can 
predict juror decision-making fairly consistently. For example, the presence of an 
authoritarian personality, defined as a strong preference for order, for clearly 
articulated rules, and for powerful leadership, is modestly related to individuals’ 
likelihood to vote for conviction in criminal cases (Narby, Cutler & Moran, 1993). 
In general, juror disposition appears to have a mixed effect on verdicts, and effects 
of attitudes generally vary from case to case (Penrod, 1990). 
 
Trial Consultants Are Generally Better than Attorneys at Jury Selection 
“I knew we had the case won when we seated the last bigot on the jury.” – 
Richard “Racehorse” Haynes (defense attorney), quoted 1979. 
 
“Never accept a juror whose occupation begins with a P. This includes 
pimps, prostitutes, preachers, plumbers, procurers, psychologists, physicians, 
psychiatrists, printers, painters, philosophers, professors, phoneys, parachutists, 
pipe-smokers, or part-time anythings.” – William Jennings Bryan (U.S. 
Congressman, Democratic presidential nominee, and former Secretary of State), 
1973. 
 
Many in favor of SJS argue that however its techniques may fare in the 
academic laboratory, SJS is successful because its methods are superior to those of 
trial attorneys. Perhaps attorneys typically rely on stereotypes of group attitudes, 
whereas trial consultants are able to draw on established psychological and 
behavioral principles (Strier, 1999) – though, as previously mentioned, how much 
they do so has been called into question. Another advantage that the SJS approach 
has over traditional lawyer methods is that trial consultants are able to use 
information that is case- and location-specific. They conduct focus groups and 
mock trials using representative samples from the community in which the trial is 
to be held. Jury consultants often work as a team, which allows them to exchange 
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ideas and consult with each other, thereby improving the quality of their work 
product. A trial attorney, on the other hand, often works alone, without the benefit 
of collaboration with others (Strier, 1999). One simple, but undeniable, benefit that 
trial consulting firms offer attorneys is the ability of the trial consultant to focus on 
jury selection when the lawyer, due to his or her involvement in the many aspects 
of a case, is not able to do so (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). 
  
The Free Market is Proof of the Effectiveness of SJS 
 Other scholars of the jury system have argued that the fact that trial 
consulting has flourished in today’s marketplace is in itself proof of its 
effectiveness (Stolle et al, 1996). If attorneys and their clients are willing to spend 
what can amount to between $75 and $300 per hour for consultants – and larger 
cases can even run into the high six or even seven figures total – the service that 
these consultants provide must have some merit (Strier, 1999). Stolle et al. (1996) 
pointed out that some trial consultants and some SJS techniques are probably 
superior to others, and, over time, the market should select the more effective 
individuals and firms to continue practicing, thus ensuring a higher-quality 
product. Proponents of this view might argue that theoretical arguments about 
effectiveness should be put aside and the free market should be given the last word 
on whether SJS remains viable. 
 
The Effectiveness of SJS is Situational 
 It appears that the influence of SJS is situational: it has a stronger effect at 
some times than at others. Kressel and Kressel (2002) have identified several 
instances in which SJS is more likely to have an effect on the outcome of a trial. 
Such instances include: when cases are publicized; when the evidence is 
ambiguous and does not favor one side more than the other; when juror views are 
related to demographic characteristics and personality attributes that can be 
directly observed; when the predictors of juror voting are not immediately obvious 
to either attorney, even when they oppose lawyerly intuition; when attorneys are 
permitted to conduct a thorough voir dire; when the court is liberal in its allowance 
of peremptory challenges (attorneys are allowed to strike a limited number of 
jurors from the panel without having to give a reason. These allowances are 
referred to as peremptory challenges. Beyond that, attorneys are also allowed an 
unlimited number of challenges for cause – they may strike a juror, but must 
demonstrate that the prospective juror in question is biased or, based on some 
relationship to the case, is likely to be biased for or against one side); and when the 
budget for the trial allows for extensive pretrial research.  
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Trial Consultants as “Enablers of Justice” 
 Advocates of SJS have also defended the practice on grounds of fairness, 
although such defenses are more difficult to corroborate than defenses of 
effectiveness. Trial consultants claim that their goal is to seat less biased juries, 
juries that are more likely to deliver a fair verdict (Kressel & Kressel, 2002). 
Adherents (e.g., Vinson, 1986; as cited in Penrod, 1990) claim that their methods 
help ensure that the ultimate goals of the jury system, including the right to trial by 
a fair and impartial jury, are realized. Jury consultants often present “themselves as 
enablers rather than disablers of the jury system” (Kressel & Kressel, 2002, p. 82). 
 
Proposed Reforms 
 Scholars have proposed solutions to address the issue of fairness of SJS. 
[Solutions to enhance the effectiveness of jury selection or to improve techniques 
are often closely guarded by trial consulting firms – even at ASTC conferences, 
trial consultants offer each other little in the way of trade sharing (Kressel & 
Kressel, 2002)].  Here are a few suggested solutions that Strier (1999) has outlined: 
· Outlaw trial consulting by non-lawyers. (This suggestion would be difficult 
to implement, as it leads directly to a slippery slope argument. One could 
question, then, why not outlaw expert witnesses, investigators and all non-
lawyer professions in litigation support?) 
· Limit voir dire questioning by attorneys (who trial consultants could coach). 
Instead, judges should be the sole performers of this function. 
· Reduce or eliminate peremptory challenges by attorneys. These challenges 
are not protected under the Constitution, nor are they essential to a fair trial. 
If peremptory challenges were outlawed, judges would be likely to expand 
the permitted challenges for cause, but at least those challenges are more 
easily justified. 
· Make consultant surveys by one side available to the opponent side. 
· Require disclosure of the use of a trial consultant. If this were a requirement, 
such disclosure would permit the other side to hire its own jury consultant or 
a criminal defendant could request a court-appointed consultant. (This 
proposed reform also gives way to a slippery slope, i.e., why not require 
disclosure of use of other types of litigation support?)  
· Prohibit investigation of prospective and actual jurors. 
· Require state licensing of trial consultants. Such a requirement would create 
minimum standards of competence and ethics for practitioners and would 
protect the public against incompetent or dishonest consultants (Strier, 
2001). 
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· Appoint trial consultants for poor defendants. The Los Angeles Superior 
Court in the Reginald Denny trial did exactly this, but such appointments 
remain extremely rare. Perhaps this reform would bridge the gap between 
wealthy litigants who can afford trial consultants and typical litigants who 
cannot. 
· Require consultants to perform a set percentage of pro bono work, ensuring 
greater accessibility of an often prohibitively expensive service. 
· Develop a binding ethical code, superior to that set forth by the ASTC, for 
consultants (Stolle et al., 1996).  
 
Conclusion 
Because it is a relatively young field, trial consulting and, more specifically, 
scientific jury selection, are still growing. SJS has come a long way in the past 
30 years, and does not appear likely to stay the same for long. In particular, the 
discrepancy between the limited effectiveness of scientific jury selection in the 
academic laboratory, and the market demand for SJS that causes litigants to pay 
substantial amounts of money for such services, may come to be reconciled. It 
is not known what will happen to the profession in the future: whether it will 
come under stricter regulation and continue to gain legitimacy and stimulate 
scholarship, or whether, due to questionable effectiveness, practitioners will 
face reduced demand for their services. If the demand for SJS services is due 
not to the effectiveness of such services, but rather to a the tendency of 
attorneys and clients to simply feel more comfortable having “expert” input into 
the selection of a jury panel, then whether the market for SJS will stay strong or 
die out is unknown. Another very strong possibility is that SJS truly is effective, 
and that experimental research suggests otherwise because the elements that 
cause SJS to operate effectively in a courtroom cannot be adequately 
reproduced in the academic laboratory; therefore, research from academia 
argues against the effectiveness of SJS. Isolated examples of effective scientific 
jury selection, such as the consultant-assisted selection of jurors favorable to the 
defense in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, can be found. The fairness issue 
surrounding the practice of SJS is not likely to clear up on its own. Some critics 
have suggested an overhaul of the practice, if not a complete ban, due to the 
fundamental injustice that some believe underlies its application. If the market 
for SJS stays strong and the outlawing of SJS remains unlikely, it is quite 
possible that it will come under stricter practice and ethics regulations to protect 
public interests. In any event, because scientific and practical interest in its 
principles and applications has been high, scientific jury selection will probably 
be a topic of study for decades to come.   
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